The empirical validity of the locality (LOC) principle of relativity is used to argue in favour of a local hidden variable theory (HVT) for individual quantum processes. It is shown that such a HVT may reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics (QM), provided the reproducibility of initial hidden variable states is limited. This means that in a HVT limits should be set to the validity of the notion of counterfactual definiteness (CFD). This is supported by the empirical evidence that past, present, and future are basically distinct. Our argumentation is contrasted with a recent one by Stapp resulting in the opposite conclusion, i.e. nonlocality or the existence of faster-than-light influences. We argue that Stapp's argumentation still depends in an implicit, but crucial, way on both the notions of hidden variables and of CFD. In addition, some implications of our results for the debate between Bohr and Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bell's inequality (BI) [1] illustrates the fundamental conflict between the quantum formalism and any formalism, aimed at reproducing QM, in which the validity of all classical principles is assumed in a quantum context (the so-called "Hidden variable (HV) program" according to Kochen and Specker [2] ). In spite of the existence of very reasonable arguments -both theoretical and empirical -which retain the validity of the relativistic locality principle, [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and which remove any quantum inconsistency or "paradox", some people continue to propose arguments in favour of nonlocality (for a survey of the recent literature, see e.g. Ref. 8) .
One sequence of such nonlocality argumentations has been set up by H.P. Stapp, starting in 1971 [9] and so far ending with his recent paper in Am. J. Phys. [10] While his earlier argumentations were based explicitly on the universal validity of CFD and on the assumption of the existence of hidden variables (HVs), his later ones are claimed to be no longer dependent on these assumptions. Stapp concludes that the premises of QM entail ". . . some sort of failure of the notion that no influence of any kind can act over a spacelike interval."
In his last nonlocality proof, Stapp [11] is concerned to compare ". . . the possible consequences of making different choices. . . " and admits that ". . . the argument involves a certain weak form of counterfactual reasoning." It was precisely the use of CFD in this work that was criticized by Mermin, [12] Unruh, [13] and Shimony and Stein. [14] As on past occasions (see Refs. 15,16,17) Stapp * Electronic address: willy.debaere@UGent.be could not be convinced, as these criticisms were followed by several replies. [18, 19] In the Abstract of Ref. 10 it is stated again: "The premises include neither the existence of hidden variables nor counterfactual definiteness, nor any premise that effectively entails the general existence of unperformed local measurements". In the same paper Stapp admits once more that "The argument given above rests heavily upon the use of counterfactuals: the key statement SR involves, in a situation in which R2 is performed and gives outcome '+,' the idea 'if, instead, R1 had been performed...'". In Ref. 11 Stapp complains about the criticism that his nonlocality argumentations still depend on counterfactual reasoning: "This fact is sometimes taken as a sufficient reason to discard wholesale all EPR-Bell-type arguments. That tactic is not rational." Yet, in former work Stapp [20] stated that "No satisfactory derivation of nonlocality, or the existence of faster-than-light influences, can be based upon such a CFD assumption: a failure of this assumption is (at least in my opinion) far more likely than the existence of a faster-than-light influence." From Stapp's persistence to prove the nonlocality property of QM, it is apparent that he has changed his opinion considerably, and tries to remove the assumption of CFD from his nonlocality proofs. Because also his recent proof needs CFD in some (stronger or weaker) form, the previous criticism applies also to that new proof.
In the present work our criticism of that kind of proofs is also directed against the unjustified use of CFD. The difference, however, with the work by Mermin, Unruh, and Shimony and Stein, is that we are able to give a plausible physical explanation for the possible invalidity of CFD in the context of all nonlocality proofs. Our approach is based 1) on the argument that for entertaining reasonable and rational argumentations in which single quantum events are involved, one should first assume explicitly the existence of an appropriate quantitative formal scheme describing such processes, and 2) on the further obvious requirement that the theory may not violate basic empirical data, such as Einstein locality as specified in Sec. 2. In Ref. 10 Stapp then continues by arguing that his use of CFD is justified (or at least is different from the use of CFD by e.g. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), and by Bell in a HV context) on the ground of his assumptions "1. Free Choice", "2. No Backward in Time Influence", "3. Validity of Predictions of quantum theory (QT): Certain predictions of quantum theory in a Hardy-type experiment are valid." However, we show in Sec. 6 that the context in which his assumption "1. Free Choice" is used, is equivalent with the assumption of HVs. Furthermore, the passages in Stapp's proof which deal with alternative choices, definitely concern individual events, and are all of the counterfactual type. In order to show the unjustified use of CFD in these nonlocality-of-QM proofs, we will specify in Sec. 5 in detail the conditions which justify counterfactual considerations. This will allow us to show in Sec. 6 the equivalence between the assumptions "Free Choice" and HVs.
Although it is widely believed that it is the principle LOC that should break down (i.e. Bell's theorem), we continue our past approach [3, 4, 15, 16, 17] and argue that the origin of the conflict between QM and classicalmechanics (CM)-like schemes is the assumed general validity of the idea of CFD, applied to the domain of individual quantum processes. At first sight this conclusion coincides with the critical remarks by Mermin and Unruh (who warn to be careful with the use of CFD), and with those by Shimony and Stein (in terms of "possible worlds"). There are, however, three main differences with our procedure to get our conclusion: 1) we point to the fact that any nonlocality-of-QM argumentation (including Stapp's recent one) intermingles valid QM predictions with predictions for alternative individual incompatible measurement outcomes;
2) we remark that in so doing one leaves the domain of validity and of applicability of QM (which is about ensembles of similarly prepared systems), and consistency demands the introduction of a quantitative formalism for these individual quantum processes, i.e. the existence of something like a HV formalism is all the time implicitly presupposed. The alternative, followed in most nonlocality argumentations, is to deny the need of HVs and to recourse in unreliable semantics;
3) we refer to former work by Houtappel, Van Dam, and Wigner, [21] who stress the equal importance of initial conditions within a particular theory. Joining this view, we are able to give a plausible physical significance of a possible invalidity of CFD at the individual quantum level of description. First, it means that the breakdown of CFD concerns the HVT, and not QM -in QM CFD is valid, see Sec. 5. Second, the HV states which represent the initial conditions within the HVT, do no longer have the property of being reproducible in future preparations. In former work we called this the "nonreproducibility hypothesis" (NRH); 4) our conclusion NRH points, possibly, to the origin of the existence of incompatible observables in QM, and, maybe, to the existence of the "arrow of time" as a basic property of nature's evolution.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF LOCALITY
The requirement that ". . . no influence of any kind can act over a spacelike interval" may be considered as a general definition of locality. Its quantitative expression depends on the theory which describes these influences or physical processes. If this influence is understood as pertaining to e.g. quantized fields, one gets the condition that the field operators associated with spacelike separated regions should commute (see Sec. 3.3). Ultimately, these fields are used to make statements about measurement outcomes. Because the assumed causal relationship between the sets of past and future outcomes, is also the result of the propagation of these physical influences, the above locality principle applies equally to these observable quantities. So, because these observations may be considered as "events" in space-time, the locality principle as defined above, includes the locality principle of relativity. According to Einstein, [22] it means that ". . . the real, factual situation of S 1 does not depend on what is done with S 2 which is spatially separated from the former". This locality principle has been taken over by Bell [1] (". . . the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past. . . "), and is the one adopted in most other papers. Formulated in this way, the locality principle concerns observable quantities, and is called also "Einstein locality". It is this definition of LOC which will be adopted in the present paper. In QM these observable quantities are represented by Hermitean operators, and in a tentative HVT the representation is e.g. by "result functions" A, A ′ , B, B ′ , i.e. the ones figuring in Bell-type inequalities and in nonlocality-of-QM argumentations.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF LOCALITY
Successful and acceptable physical theories are built on principles which correspond with well established basic empirical data. In the case of QM, wave-particle duality and Einstein locality, as defined in Sec. 2, belong to these data. The first one corresponds with the superposition principle, and the second one guarantees the independence of the statistical QM predictions from actions or choices in far-away regions, outside the observer's light cone. [23, 24] As a result, these principles constitute the basis of all existing (quantum) theories, and no violation of these principles have ever been observed. [52] There-fore, in our view it seems rational to accept (instead of to criticize) the validity of LOC within QM and in any other physical theory. It is our purpose to convince the reader of the overwhelming evidence in support of LOC. In addition to the empirical evidence, we summarize below some further theoretical arguments in favour of the validity of LOC.
A. Nonlocality Cannot Have General Validity
Consider one single individual correlated quantum process. Observations confirm that the evolution between the preparation and each of the correlated measurements proceeds in a local way, in agreement with relativity. On the one hand, according to the idea of quantum nonlocality -or at least according to some of its interpretations -, the simultaneous correlated measurement processes should influence each other in a nonlocal way. Until now no one has been able to give a reasonable explanation for this kind of dichotomy in the evolution of physical processes. However, this problem can be removed immediately by accepting the general validity of locality, and by considering the nonlocality argumentations as evidence for other nonclassical properties of underlying HV states, such as our NRH conclusion. This removes all contradictions, and everything is now again supported by empirical data.
B. QM is Formally Local
In general, QM makes deterministic predictions only for the expectation values of observables. It follows that in QM it is only via such deterministic statistical predictions that a nonlocal QM property may, eventually, be observed. In this respect, it has been shown by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [23, 24] and by others, that these predictions are independent of far-away actions. Hence, statements -or conclusions -about the nonlocal influencing of single measurement outcomes by other, far-away, operations cannot be the result of argumentations held within QM. Such argumentations require rather the introduction of another formalism, in terms of theoretical elements or notions not contained in QM.
C. Locality is a Basic Principle in all Elaborations of QM
Locality is never empirically violated and, as a result, it is built in explicitly in all successful physical theories, such as in any formulation of relativistic quantum field theory (QFT), string theory, etc. In these theories, field operators A(x) and B(y) in space-time points x, y satisfy the commutation relation [28] [ A(x), B(y)] = i∆(x − y) = 0 for (x − y)
known as "microscopic causality" or "local commutativity. In (1), ∆(x − y) is a singular function vanishing outside the light cone. This basic relation represents the universal validity of causality and locality. It means that for spacelike separated intervals x − y, the observables A, B commute and, hence, can be measured together in such a way that the processes resulting in the measured outcomes do not disturb each other, i.e. are independent, in agreement with the principle LOC. Similarly, in Weinberg's classic book [29] the commutativity of spacelike separated observables ψ l (x), ψ l ′ (y) is stated as:
with the justification ". . . The condition (2) is often described as a causality condition, because if x − y is spacelike then no signal can reach y from x, so that a measurement of ψ l (x) at point x should not be able to interfere with a measurement of ψ l ′ or ψ † l ′ at point y." For an axiomatic approach, see e.g. Ref. 30 .
From the success of these theories, it may be concluded that there is no reason why the conflict between QM and the BI should be interpreted as a breakdown of LOC in QM. Recently, the validity of locality and causality in QFT has been defended by Tommasini. [31] D. Irrelevance of Nonlocality in the Conflict between QM and Classical-like Theories
The idea of quantum nonlocality results from a program which tries to reconstruct QM (which makes deterministic predictions for statistics) from a more detailed theory of the classical type for the individual case. According to Kochen and Specker [2] this program investigates ". . . the possibility of embedding quantum theory into a classical theory . . . ". However, this HV program is ill defined because it violates basic QM rules from the outset. [32, 33] Formally this is evident from Landau's identity: [34] 
where the observables A, A ′ , B, B ′ represent correlated measurements along 4 possible, but incompatible, experimental settings: a, a ′ in one region L and b, b ′ in another spacelike separated region R. From Eq. (3) it follows that the expectation value of the left hand side satisfies Cirel'son's inequality: [35] 
It is worthwhile to remark here that Eq. (3), and hence also Eq. (4), is a consequence of property (1), i.e. of the assumed commutativity of spacelike separated QM observables, being an immediate formal expression of Einstein locality. The fact that empirical data do not violate Eq. (4), may be considered as convincing evidence that the principle of Einstein locality is firmly incorporated in QM, at least if one restricts to its domain of validity and of application, namely the ensemble of similarly prepared individual cases. Leaving this domain easily leads to wrong conclusions, such as the empirically not supported quantum nonlocality. In this respect one may apply van Kampen's "theorem IV", [36] according to which ". . . whoever endows ψ with more meaning than is needed for computing observable phenomena is responsible for the consequences" -here, for explaining how the alleged quantum nonlocality is compatible with the empirical validity of Einstein locality. Now, in order to get a BI from Eq. (4), a further assumption should be added, namely the validity of CFD for single quantum processes. Restricting to quantitative considerations, this brings us back to the HV program. The assumed validity of CFD (either explicitly or implicitly) in any HV program, amounts in fact to a return to the classical formalism in which all observables are compatible and all commutators vanish. Otherwise stated, such a program violates QM already from the start, not because of a violation of locality, but because of the assumed unrestricted validity of CFD for single quantum events. QM and locality are valid because the data satisfy Cirel'son's relation (4).
In such classical-like HV programs, inequality (4) reduces to the BI:
which is violated by QM predictions. It is seen that it is the nonvanishing of local, single particle's, commutators [ A, A ′ ] and [ B, B ′ ], which is responsible for the violation of BI by QM. This leads to the conclusion that it is the noncommutativity of quantum observables pertaining to a single system (which may be part of a larger one of correlated systems) that plays a crucial role in the violation of the BI by QM. Hence, nonlocality cannot be held responsible for that violation.
It is our opinion that this extended list of arguments in favour of locality, is convincing enough to allow the conclusion that the conflict between BI and QM may only be explained by rejecting the other -mostly implicit -basic assumption, namely the validity of CFD at the subquantum level.
IV. HIDDEN VARIABLES AND SINGLE QUAN-TUM PROCESSES
We argue in this section that all nonlocality argumentations contain statements about individual quantum processes, and that in general hidden variables are needed for their quantitative description.
A. The Structure of Physical Theory
We assume that physical processes proceed in a lawful way, and that the relevant basic laws have a mathematical expression. Our physical theories, then, are representations of these basic laws, and we shall consider them as deterministic formal schemes, which allow an observer to connect in a mathematical way causal relationships between consecutive observations. The knowledge about the first set of observations may be considered as initial conditions within the physical theory. The extension of this formal scheme with statements about the significance of the theory's concepts with respect to an eventually underlying reality, belongs to the interpretation of the theory. In this work, however, we shall not go beyond the formalism itself, i.e. we take on a pragmatic attitude. The main point is that the theory is considered as a procedure to make predictions for future observations, given enough knowledge of previous ones. In this approach notions such as "reality", "realism", "assigned values", etc. gain their significance only by their mathematical representation. E.g. "reality" is represented by the theory's state, "assigned value" by the prediction of a measurement outcome, etc.
In any formal scheme a physical situation is represented by a state function, and the space-time evolution is determined by dynamical equations. Because the theory concerns observations by macroscopic observers, a procedure should be present for relating measurement outcomes with the physical state. Another important notion (yet frequently overlooked in foundational issues) is that of the domain of applicability and of validity of the theory. This is the domain for which the theory makes verifiable, hence deterministic, predictions for measurement outcomes in a successful way. As a consequence of our pragmatic view, we will consider any statement in an argumentation as a valid and a justified one, only if that statement can be verified in an actual experiment. This is an obvious (yet frequently overlooked) requirement, because otherwise there is no means to decide whether a statement is false or true. This guiding rule will be used in Sec. 5 to set up criteria for justifying counterfactual statements.
Let us now look back at CM, QM and HVT from the above pragmatic point of view. CM's domain is the description of single processes (giving rise to macroscopic observations) belonging to the macroscopic domain. QM's domain, on the contrary, is the description of the ensemble of single microscopic processes (again giving rise to macroscopic outcomes). Only for such an ensemble are the predictions determined in a deterministic, hence verifiable, way. It follows that if considerations are held for processes which fall outside a theory's (e.g. CM's or QM's) domain, then this implies the implicit assumption that the reasoning presupposes another theory which is appropriate for the situation considered. In particular, this is the case with all nonlocality-of-QM argumentations, in which outcomes of single actual quan-tummechanical measurement processes are always compared with other single, but incompatible, hypothetical outcomes, i.e. outcomes which "would have occurred if the alternative, incompatible, choice had been made".
We conclude that in all nonlocality-of-QM argumentations the availability of a HVT for single quantum processes is presupposed. It is only under the further assumption, that the HVT's initial conditions may be reproduced, that it is justified to compare predictions for single outcomes. If it turns out, finally, that inconsistencies arise, then one reasonable conclusion is that the HVT's initial conditions cannot be actualized, i.e. reproduced, again.
Our point is that in many of these argumentations the need of HVs or a HVT is denied. Instead, the hypothesis of HVs or a HVT is replaced by a semantical description in terms of words only. In this way the assumption of a HVT is hidden and made implicity. To remedy for this inconsistency, the idea of a HVT must be introduced explicitly.
Also in his recent work Stapp rejects a priori an analysis in terms of HVs, on the incorrect grounds 1) that the HV assumption is ". . . logically equivalent to the assumption that values can be pre-assigned conjunctively and locally to all of the outcomes of all of the alternative possible measurements.", and 2) that it ". . . conflicts with . . . the orthodox quantum philosophical attitude that one should not make any assumption that effectively postulates the existence of a well defined outcome of a localized measurement process that is not performed." Argument 1) is incorrect because from the end of the previous paragraph and from Sec. 5 it follows that it can be invalidated easily by setting limits to the reproducibility of initial states in the HVT -which amounts to setting limits to CFD. Argument 2) is incorrect because QM has in general nothing at all to say about "the existence of a well defined outcome of a localized measurement process that is not performed", i.e. in QM such an assumption can neither be made nor be denied a priori on "orthodox quantum pilosophical" grounds. Only when a new formalism, such as a HVT, is presumed does it have sense to ponder about arguments 1) and 2).
Applying, then, the format of CM and QM to the hypothetical HVT, a general state λ(x, t) should be introduced as a representation of the individual physical situation (or, in EPR's terminology, a time-dependent "element of reality"), in the same way as the QM state |Ψ is a representation of the "reality corresponding with the ensemble". This individual situation may well be the result of an observer having made a particular choice. But different choices cannot be considered together, because only one of them may correspond to a measurement process. Hence, different choices for individual processes should be represented by different HV states.
As in CM and QM, dynamical laws determine in a deterministic way the HV state at any other instant. Because the HVT is aimed to describe individual situations, the HV state λ(x, t) may be considered as a more faithful representation of nature -or reality -than the QM state ψ(x, t). Finally, a link with observation by a conscious observer is established by introducing result functions R(λ A (x, t)), which give the outcome r = R(λ A (x, t)) when the observable A is measured.
B. The Role of Initial Conditions
Houtappel, Van Dam, and Wigner [21] stressed the equal importance of the initial conditions and of the laws of physics ". . . because the laws of nature do not lead to observable consequences unless the initial conditions are given . . . ". These initial conditions concern the theory's state representing, in terms of EPR's terminology, some "element of physical reality". In CM, the initial state is determined by the prepared values of a number of observables (which all are compatible, the prepared value of one observable not being influenced by the preparation of any other one). In QM the initial state is determined by the some repeated preparation procedure, and in a HVT the prepared initial state is represented by λ(x µ ), which is up to now completely unspecified and, hence, very general. Whereas in CM and in QM states may be reproduced, the reproducibility of λ(x µ ) (which would justify the use of CFD in HVT, see Sec. 5) should have the character of an extra assumption.
C. Determinism or Indeterminism?
Determinism is a formal property of any theory. It is this property which allows the theory to make verifiable predictions. In the case of QM, the deterministic predictions concern the statistics of outcomes within an ensemble of measurement events. Because the statistics obey deterministic laws, it seems plausible to assume that also the individual quantum processes obey deterministic laws. We consider this a reasonable approach (among other reasonable ones).
One of the origins of the dissatisfaction with QM is precisely the discrepancy between the fact that QM in general makes only statistical predictions in a deterministic way, and the idea that the observed individual outcomes should allegedly have no determinite cause in the past (such as in Copenhagen-like interpretations of QM [37] ). In the words of Stapp: [38] "Some writers claim to be comfortable with the idea that there is in nature, at its most basic level, an irreducible element of chance. I, however, find unthinkable the idea that between two possibilities there can be a choice having no basis whatsoever. Chance is an idea useful for dealing with a world partly known to us. But it has no rational place among the ultimate constituents of nature." Such words are reminiscent of Einstein's view that "God does not play dice". However, on account of Stapp's recent attempts to prove the nonlocality property of QM, this former view of him is clearly opposite to his present one.
An apparently overlooked -or forgotten -old interferometer thought experiment by Renninger, [39] may be invoked as an indication for the existence for determinism even at the ontological level. Indeed, in Renninger's thought experiment, it is possible to influence in a causal way the realities corresponding with a single quantum system moving in both arms of an interferometer, in such a way that the final outcome is predictable with certainty, no matter how many times -in principle an infinite number of times -one has influenced these realities moving simultaneously in both arms. The deterministic laws for the individual case, then, constitute the HVT for individual quantum processes. At present, however, the observer's limited technical capabilities prevent control over the supplementary observables. Such a HVT should then bear the general properties of a physical theory, discussed in Sec. 4.1. This means that also in a HVT, locality should still be a valid principle, and that for given initial conditions (of which one is not a priori sure that they are reproducible, as is yet empirically the case in CM and QM) of the HVs, the HVT should predict in a deterministic way the unique outcome of the future event that will actually happen.
Some further remarks with respect to determinism may be made here. Jammer [40] notes that "It has been claimed that even the most "progressive" theoretician believes at the bottom of his heart in a strictly deterministic, objective world even if his teachings categorically deny such a view . . . It explains, however, why some physicists rejected the prevailing probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics and tried to demonstrate that the existing theory in spite of its spectacular success is only a provisional approximation to a deeper scientific truth." With respect to the realizability of EPR's program (suggesting a more detailed, deterministic, description of the individual quantum process) Dirac's opinion [41] is that ". . . we think it might turn out that ultimately Einstein will prove to be right, because the present form of quantum mechanics should not be considered as the final form. There are great difficulties . . . in connection with the present quantum mechanics. It is the best that one can do till now. But, one should not suppose that it will survive indefinitely into the future. And we think it is quite likely that at some future time we may get an improved quantum mechanics in which there will be a return to determinism and which will, therefore, justify the Einstein point of view". More recently, in an interview on Dutch TV, S. Weinberg expressed a similar opinion and claimed that maybe, finally, natural processes proceed in an entirely deterministic way. It may be noted also that recently 't Hooft [42] started developing deterministic models for individual quantum processes.
V. CRITERIA FOR A JUSTIFIED USE OF CFD
It is argued in the present work, that the reason for the appearance of quantum contradictions is the unjustified use of CFD in the domain of individual quantum phenomena. Usually, the general validity of CFD is accepted either as a self-evident assumption, or by invoking the authority of Bohr: "Bohr repeatedly emphasized the freedom of experimenters to examine either aspect or another of an individual quantum system" (Stapp in Ref.
11, p. 301), or: ". . . Bohr did not want to take the difficult road of trying to ban all use of counterfactual concepts in physics . . . he recognized that counterfactual concepts do play an important role in the pragmatic approach to physics that he was pursuing." (Stapp in Ref. 10) .
Also others refer to Bohr, e.g. Peres [43] states that "Bohr did not contest the validity of counterfactual reasoning. He wrote: 'our freedom of handling the measuring instruments is characteristic of the very idea of experiment . . . we have a completely free choice whether we want to determine the one or the other of these quantities. . . ' . . . Just as EPR, Bohr found it perfectly legitimate to consider counterfactual alternatives. He had no doubt that the observer had free will and could arbitrarily choose his experiments" (emphasis by A. Peres). We remark here that there is no incompatibility between a possible determinism on the HV level of description, and our experience of free will. The reason is that the observer's limitations prevent him to know, or to become aware, of his precise HV state λ(x, t).
Both Stapp and Peres argue that in everyday life and in physics, CFD is an essential part of reasoning. Indeed, it is on account of the validity of CFD in CM, that scheduling a journey is an allowed reasoning, and in Ref. 11 Stapp considers the case where and electron "'would have landed' if the experimenter had used in the experiment a second apparatus, 'instead of' the first one". The point is that in both of these CM cases, CFD is used in a justified way, because the initial conditions may be reproduced, allowing the verification of the counterfactual statement. According to Stapp this then ". . . illustrates the fact that theoretical assumptions often allow one to say with certainty, on the basis of the outcome of a certain experiment, what 'would have happened' if an alternative possible apparatus had been used."
It is evident that similar examples may be given also in the domain of applicability and of validity of QM. In QM the state |Ψ is reproducible and, when the expectation value A is actually measured, then it has sense to ask the counterfactual question "What would have been the expectation value B if another observable B were measured instead". This counterfactual question has sense because it can be investigated in a real, actual, experiment described by the same quantum state |Ψ . By looking why CFD is valid in the specific examples of CM and of QM, we get the following three criteria for a justified use of CFD in each particular situation.
A. Criterion of Availability of a Theory (CT)
The above examples of CM and QM suggest that an unproblematic use of CFD is connected with the availability of a working theory, and with theoretical possibilities which are allowed not only by that theory, but also by nature itself. If it turns out that some theoretical possibility is empirically not allowed, then such a possibility cannot be considered counterfactually. For example, in Newton's theory negative mass is a theoretical possibility which is not allowed by nature. According to this theoretical possibility, particles in a graviational field should not fall down but move upwards, contrary to any observation. In general, superselection rules are added to the theory "by hand", in order to remove such cases or initial conditions. Now, as a rule quantum paradoxes generally arise when QM predictions, dealing with ensembles of quantum events (for which a detailed theory, QM, is available), are tried to be reconstructed by means of considerations about the individual events of this ensemble (for which as yet no detailed theory is available). However, consistency then demands that such considerations be held within some theoretical framework, so that all assumptions may be stated in an explicit and quantitative way. We shall call this requirement the criterion CT, i.e. for each particular case, a quantitative formal scheme must always be presupposed.
B. Criterion of Verifiability (CV)
Physical theories should make verifiable predictions, and this implies that they are formally deterministic. This property determines the theory's domain of applicability, and as long as the predictions are correct, the domain of applicability coincides with the domain of validity.
For instance, CM makes deterministic predictions for individual events, and its domain of applicability is that of the individual case. However, CM does not apply to individual quantum processes, so that its domain of validity is rather restricted. Therefore, CM is not complete.
QM, on the other hand, in general makes deterministic predictions only for the statistics of measurement outcomes within an ensemble of measurements following a specific preparation. It follows that the domain of applicability and of validity of QM is that of ensembles. Of course, these deterministic QM predictions for ensembles of quantum systems, may be transformed into probabilistic statements about individual measurement outcomes. However, these probabilistic statements about individual cases do not satisfy CV. Therefore, the description of the individual quantum process does not belong to the domain of applicability of QM, but rather belongs to its interpretation. On this ground neither QM may be termed a complete theory, which was also the conclusion of EPR's argumentation.
Finally, applied to possible HVTs for individual quantum processes, CV requires them to be also of the deterministic type. In such HVTs, individual quantum preparations of both the object system and the measurement system for a specific observable, should allow then to make predictions with certainty for that observable.
C. Criterion of Actualizability (CA)
Given a theoretical scheme, physical relevance of counterfactual reasoning requires furtheron that the conditions which underly physical argumentations not only are theoretically possible, but also that they may correspond with actualizable physical situations.
In particular, counterfactual argumentations which concern non-actual processes and events, have physical relevance only insofar as one is guaranteed of the possible actualizability, at least once, of the non-actual process. It should be clear that such a guarantee cannot come from the allowance by the theory of a particular situation as a theoretical possibility, but may come only from actual experience. Such an actualizability or reproducibility condition would justify not only the use of CFD, but also the (further) assumption that counterfactually considered processes obey the same rules as actual processes.
In summary, counterfactual reasoning in some domain is justified provided it is assumed that a formally deterministic theory for the relevant processes exists, and that the physical situations it describes are actually reproducible, in the sense that they are representable by identical states within the theory. If this assumption does not correspond with reality, then a number of situations will be encountered for which paradoxical results may be derived.
So, it may be envisaged that restricting the justified use of CFD for single quantum processes, is one of the possibilities to resolve inconsistencies ensuing from attempts to reconstruct QM in terms of a classical framework. The physical ground for a possible invalidity of CFD at the individual quantum level is that CA is not fulfilled, or that a reproducibility hypothesis (RH) concerning a former actual situation is not valid.
A picture in terms of nonreproducible situations at the subquantum level provides, then, an alternative physical explanation for the apparent "nonlocality" in various correlated situations (of the EPR-Bell-type), and for the phenomenon of contextuality in a number of other situations (of the KS-type). Moreover, this alternative is supported by the empirical fact that past, present and future are different. The validity of CFD at that level would mean that nature allows history to be repeated.
VI. COMPARISON WITH STAPP'S RECENT NONLOCALITY ARGUMENTATION
A. Equivalence of Stapp's Property "Free Choices" with CFD and HVs Comparing Stapp's earlier proofs (e.g. Refs. 9, 44) with his more recent ones (Refs. 10, 11) Stapp replaces his former assumptions HV and CFD by a property called "Free Choice". He claims that CFD and HV entail "Free Choice", but that the converse is not true. We argue, however, that in the context of his nonlocality argumentation, "Free Choice" is equivalent with CFD and HV.
As mentioned in Sec. 5.1, Stapp tries to get a justification for the validity of CFD in individual cases by referring to Bohr and he states: "This 'Free Choice' assumption is important because it allows the causal part of cause-and-effect relationships to be identified: the choices made by experimenters to be considered to be causes. This identification underlies all Bell-type arguments about causal relationships". Therefore, in his argumentation "CFD" is now replaced by "Choice". It follows, however, from our discussion in Sec. 4.1 that by reasoning on individual quantum events and processes in terms of "choice", the existence of the notions of HV and of HVT is still implicitly assumed. Because only one choice can be made at a time, each choice (made at one particular instant) must be represented by its own a HV state in the appropriate HVT. In nonlocality argumentations, the individual case concerns an entangled situation, and HV states λ L , λ R represent the physical situation in two spacelike separated regions L and R. Stapp's idea to introduce choice (e.g. in region R) implicitly assumes, then, that the HV state λ L remains identically the same at different times. But this is again a counterfactual statement about an individual quantum process which, as follows from our discussion in Sec. 5, is only justified under the condition that RH is valid. Hence, the notions of "Choice" and "CFD", or "RH", are identical when translated in the necessary HV formalism. 
(Eq. (12) in Ref. 45 ) which is a correlated state for two systems i = 1, 2, with {|c i , |d i }, {|u i , |v i } different sets of basis vectors, corresponding with incompatible observables for both systems. N is a normalization constant, and the choice of the constant A 2 is such that
Stapp denotes these incompatible observables by L1, L2 in the left region L, with possible outcomes L1±, L2±, and by R1, R2 in the right region R, with possible outcomes R1±, R2±. The correspondence between both notations is given in Stapp's Appendix A:
In this notation (6) becomes:
and obeys the relations:
With (12), (13), (14) there correspond the following predictions with certainty:
while (15) corresponds with
As Mermin [12] remarks, the predictions corresponding with (16),. . . , (19) should be considered as facts which are independent from the reference frame in which the experiments are described. This, then, should justify Stapp to set up the chain
which, however, contradicts (19) , allowing Stapp to complete his nonlocality argumentation. As mentioned in the Introduction, Mermin's criticism was that at some stage of the complete proof in Ref. 11, CFD was used in an unjustified way. Now, for the state (11), Stapp considers in his new argumentation a Lorentz frame LF in which the observed outcomes in L occur before those in R. He arrives then at his nonlocality conclusion by proving two Properties 1 and 2. For the proof he uses the predictions with certainty (17) and (18) . With the notation L2 meaning that experiment L2 is performed in L, Property 1 reads: "Property 1. Quantum theory predicts that if an experiment of the Hardy-type is performed then, L2 implies SR, where, SR = If R2 is performed and gives outcome +, then if, instead, R1 had been performed the outcome would have been −."
The proof of this property is based on the assumption that ". . . the choice made in R does not affect the outcome that has already occurred in L. . . ". Here Stapp is definitely reasoning with single quantum events which in general are not described by QM, i.e. one has gone outside QM's domain of applicability. This means that the predictions with certainty (17) and (18) are valid only for two different actual ensembles, E 1 , E 2 , each of which is described by the same Hardy-state (11) . However, using the same predictions with certainty for one single ensemble, E 1 or E 2 , has no sense within QM. Indeed, from our discussion in Sec. 4 , it follows that a rational quantitative account of individual quantum phenomena presupposes the availability of a HVT. The only exceptions are those cases where QM makes predictions with certainty, i.e. for each of the predictions (16), (17), (18) separately in ensembles E 1 , E 2 , E 3 . However, the point is that Stapp combines such predictions with certainty for one single ensemble. Our argument is that a description of such a situation presupposes a HVT in terms of HV states. Furthermore, if one wants to set up a nonlocality argumentation, our criteria CV and CA require that within that theory it should be possible to keep the cause for the occurrence of the earlier outcome in region L constant. In HV terms this means that the HV state λ L in L (which gives rise to the occurrence of the definite outcome r L in L (e.g. L1± or L2±)) should be reproducible. Because R1 and R2 are incompatible, the actual outcomes in R and L can only be obtained in different experiments, occurring at different times t R1 and t R2 . For these times, one should consider in the HVT different HV states λ L (t R1 ) and λ L (t R2 ). Now, Stapp's assumption that a free choice in R which does not influence the past outcome r L in L, amounts to the condition that the cause for the occurrence of the actual outcome, namely the HV λ L , can be kept constant and gives rise to the result r L , i.e.:
Only this assumption allows Stapp to use his results (17) , (18) in tandem to get his Property 1. It is seen that in our quantitative approach, the justification of Stapp's counterfactual statements in his property SR (which is in terms of observations in R), depends crucially on the reproducibility of the HV state λ L as the cause in the region L where the actual outcome r L ≡ L2+ of experiment L2 is obtained. Hence, it is not the assumption that it is the choice in R that must be considered as the cause for the constancy of L2+, but rather the identity of the HV states
Only with the assumption of this identity of HV states, i.e. their reproducibility, may Stapp's argumentation be carried on to the inconsistency with his Property 2, from which his conclusion to the existence of ". . . some sort of faster-than-light influence" follows.
As a consequence, if the assumption RH leads to the nonlocality conclusion (which we reject on empirical and theoretical grounds, see Sec. 3, the origin of contradictory conclusions should be the invalidity of RH. Hence, without the assumption RH, Stapp's premise SR is physically irrelevant. Our present criticism is general, and applies equally well to all former nonlocality argumentations.
VII. LOCAL HV SCHEME UNDERLYING QT
QM answers successfully all relevant questions, and covers present day technological capabilities. Hence, there is as yet no empirical need for a more detailed HVT, and no one has the slightest idea how to start such a program. However, some theoretical arguments for yet to consider the idea to base QM on a HVT are 1) the dissatisfaction with the present statistical QM, 2) the attempts to remove the alleged nonlocality property of QM, and 3) the ontological existence of EPR-type "elements of reality" which have no represention in QM.
A convincing proof of this existence is given by Renninger, [39] by means of an interferometer thought experiment. Using such a setup, Renninger showed unambiguously that with each single quantum system moving through the interferometer there correspond realities moving along both paths. In terms of the notions particle and wave, one path should contain the particle, and the reality in the other path is usually called an "empty wave" (EW). By incerting phase shifters (in fact, "half wavelength" plates) he showed explicitly that these realities, including the empty wave, are causally influencable in each single case. In contrast with what Stapp calls "orthodox quantum philosophy", Renninger stated that "Die Anschaulichkeit soll nicht vorzeitig aufgegeben werden", i.e. "The pictorial representation should not be given up prematurely". Of course, these cases are covered well by QM because the interventions in both paths correspond with predictions with certainty and, hence, apply to each individual case. Recently, Hardy [46] has tried to prove the converse, namely that also the EW is able to change the state of a quantum system. It may be shown [47] that Hardy's argumentation is based on assumptions which lead to contradictory QM results. However, notwithstanding the present lack of evidence for EWs influencing themselves directly and observably other systems, Renninger has shown unambiguously their ontologic existence (see also Sec. 4.3).
Because all available empirical data are described very well by QM, they cannot be used as a clear guide for introducing a new quantitative scheme, as a substitute for QM. Therefore, we are only able to give a very general account of our resolution of the so-called "incompatible quantum results". In agreement with our starting points above, we shall adhere to the view that for each single observation there exists a causal reason on a deeper level of description. We shall assume that, instead of chance, it is our ignorance of the precise individual state, following a preparation or a measurement, which is responsible for the uncertainty about future outcomes. As the variables in QM allow only the deterministic prediction of the statistics, we will need supplementary ("hidden") variables and a new ("hidden variable") theory allowing the prediction of individual outcomes for specific initial conditions. As remarked above, it is nature itself that determines which initial conditions are realizable, and whether they are reproducible or not in subsequent runs of an experiment. Such a HVT for individual quantum processes should conform the general requirements of a theory, namely its principles should agree with empirical data (such as locality), and the initial conditions should allow to predict in a causal and deterministic way the unique outcome of future events, but only one at a time.
Consider, then, two identically prepared ensembles E 1 , E 2 , consisting each of N individual preparations, and described by a quantummechanical state |Ψ . Labeling each element in an ensemble by i, we may represent E 1 , E 2 also in terms of sets of HV states by λ(x µ i;1 ), i = 1, . . . , N , and λ(x µ i;2 ), i = 1, . . . , N , where dependence on space-time coordinates x µ is explicitly noted. In this way we may write the following equivalences:
and
We now remark that the identity with respect to the QM state vectors does not necessarily mean identity with respect to the HV states and, hence, does not imply
i.e. the sets of individual states
. . , N (25) are not necessarily identical, even after any possible reorganization of the elements of the sets. The possibility that such nonidentical ensembles on the HV level, may yet give rise to identical QM predictions for the statistics, has been proven by Kupczynski.[48] In the domain of application of CM and of QM, nature allows the preparation of physical situations such that their mathematical representation is by identical functions, i.e. the corresponding physical states are reproducible. However, it is not evident that nature allows the same to be true for individual HV states, i.e. this remains a supplementary assumption which may be invalid at a HV level of description. In the above sections we have argued in favour of the nonreproducibility of physical states at the HV level of description. As is the case with Einstein locality, this nonreproducibility is in full agreement with the empirical fact that past, present and future are observably distinct. Hence, "nonreproducibility of individual HV states" may be a possible solution for saving locality, and for removing all quantum paradoxes.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have started from the observation that all known empirical data verify the principle of Einstein locality, as defined in Sec. 2. We have argued that, rather than questioning that principle, it should be incorporated firmly in our physical theories. This has been shown the case for QM and its more recent elaborations.
Assuming the validity of this principle also in a tentative HVT for individual quantum processes, we have come to the conclusion that, in agreement with the empirical evidence that past, present and future are basically different, the validity of the notion of CFD breaks down at the HV level. In physical terms this means that HV states λ(x µ ) may have the property of being "nonreproducible". In other words, one may envisage the situation that the HVT's initial conditions can no longer be reproduced, so that it no longer has sense to ask for a single event the counterfactual question "what would have happened if, instead of the actual choice, another choice had been made".
We have argued that (formal) determinism and causality may still be valid in a HVT, just like in CM and in QM. Furthermore, specifying to correlated observations, the notions cause and effect apply between the preparation and the correlated measurements, but not between the correlated measurements themselves, the time sequence depending on the frame of reference. The existence of a correlation may be explained simply on the ground that there is a common past.
We conclude further that our NRH is compatible with the empirical existence of an arrow of time, and agrees with statements such as one of Y. Aharonov, P.G. Bergmann, J.L. Lebowitz: [49] "One of the perenially challenging problems of theoretical physics is that of the 'arrow of time.' Everyday experience teaches us that the future is qualitatively different from the past, that our practical powers of prediction differ vastly from those of memory, and that complex physical systems tend to develop in the course of time in patterns distinct from those of their antecedents."
Finally, in our approach we have got a reconciliation between Einstein's and Bohr's views. EPR's suggestion that QM may be completed by a more detailed local HVT is shown to be possible. In such a theory, EPR's "elements of physical reality" should correspond with timedependent, but nonreproducible, initial conditions in the HVT. In this way EPR's conclusion of the simultaneous existence of quantummechanical incompatible observables can be avoided. This solution roughly corresponds with EPR's last paragraph, in which they offer a similar way out of their contradictory conclusion of the simultaneous existence of quantummechanically incompatible elements of reality. Because the evolution of physical processes may proceed according to deterministic laws, Einstein's dictum that "God does not play dice" is met.
If physics is defined as being concerned, as Bohr would have it, with observable, reproducible, phenomena then a HVT, which would describe the dynamics of λ(x µ ), would be, at least at present, of no practical use because of the basic failure to know exactly the initial conditions. In that case it will be difficult -if not impossible for human beings -to surpass QM, which then may be considered a complete "FAPP" [53] theory because it answers all possible questions which may ever be posed by human observers. In this case it is not God himself who plays dice, but rather the human observer because of his intrinsic limitations.
Hence, from a fundamental point of view EPR are right. However, those prefering a more pragmatic point of view, may join Bohr in that it may turn out impossible, because of the observer's limitations, to describe causally and quantitatively individual quantum processes. Yet, surprises may never be excluded, and in a near future one may get more control over an objectively existing reality, such as brought about by the Renninger thought experiment.
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